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A SHORT HISTORY OF SEX AND CITIZENSHIP:  
THE HISTORIANS’ AMICUS BRIEF IN 
FLORES-VILLAR v. UNITED STATES 
KRISTIN A. COLLINS∗ 
The historians’ amicus brief that follows was submitted to the Supreme 
Court in Flores-Villar v. United States, an equal protection challenge to federal 
laws that regulate the citizenship status of foreign-born children of American 
parents.1  Children born in the United States are citizens by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, but the citizenship of foreign-
born children of American citizens is governed by federal statute.2  When the 
parents of such children are unmarried, those laws significantly encumber the 
ability of American fathers to secure citizenship for their children, while 
providing American mothers with a nearly unfettered ability to do the same.  
The general question before the Court in Flores-Villar – and a question that the 
Court has addressed in sum and substance on two other occasions during the 
last thirteen years – was whether the gender-asymmetry in this statutory 
scheme is consistent with constitutional sex-equality principles.3 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Boston University.  My thanks to several colleagues who 
read early versions of this introductory essay and offered helpful comments: Khiara Bridges, 
Christopher Capozzola, Nancy Cott, Linda Kerber, Linda McClain, Virginia Sapiro, and 
Rogers Smith.  Any errors are mine. 
1 Flores-Villar v. United States, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764 (U.S. June 13, 2011) 
(per curiam). 
2 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2006).  
3 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56-57 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 
(1998).  Nguyen and Miller involved challenges to the father-only legitimation and proof of 
paternity requirements of 8 U.S.C. §1409(a)(4) and 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1970), while Ruben 
Flores-Villar challenged the disparate parental residency requirements that apply, 
respectively, to fathers and mothers of foreign-born nonmarital children.  Compare 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1409(a), 1401(a)(7) (1970), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1970).  Although Congress reduced 
the duration of the parental residency requirement for nonmarital fathers in 1986, the statute 
continues to hold mothers and fathers to different standards.  Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1409(b), 
1401(g) (2006), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2006).   
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459529 
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In a 4-4 decision issued as this essay was going to press, the Court declined 
to answer this question, affirming the lower court’s decision without opinion.4   
This result leaves the question presented in Flores-Villar an open one that the 
Court may wrestle with again soon.  It is all the more pressing, then, that we 
attend to the history of sex-based regulation of citizenship, and consider how 
that history illuminates the discriminatory practices that persist in modern 
citizenship law.  
*** 
Ruben Flores-Villar was born in Mexico to an American father and a 
Mexican mother.5  Ruben had serious health problems as a newborn, and, with 
his mother’s blessing, his father and paternal grandmother (also a U.S. citizen) 
brought him to the United States for medical treatment.6  Ruben was raised 
from infancy in his father’s American household, and had little if any contact 
with his mother.7  Nevertheless, according to federal statutes that govern 
derivative citizenship, Ruben is not a U.S. citizen.8 
To secure citizenship for Ruben, his father had to establish paternity and 
legitimate Ruben before he turned twenty-one, and prove that he (the father) 
had lived in the United States for a total of ten years, five of which must have 
been after he turned fourteen but before Ruben was born.9  When Ruben’s 
citizenship was questioned by immigration officials, his father could show that 
he had legitimated his son as required, but he could not satisfy the parental 
residency requirement.  As he was only sixteen when Ruben was born, he 
could not possibly have lived in the United States for five years after he turned 
fourteen but before his son’s birth.10  Under otherwise identical circumstances, 
were Ruben’s mother the American parent, Ruben would unquestionably be an 
American citizen.  Indeed, in that case, even had Ruben lived his entire life in 
Mexico, he would be an American citizen as long as his mother could satisfy a 
 
4 Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764.  Justice Elana Kagan was recused from 
the case, as she had signed the brief opposing Flores-Villar’s petition for a writ of certiorari 
while serving as Solicitor General of the United States.  Brief for the United States in 
Opposition, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764.   
5 Brief for Petitioner at 1, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764. 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. at 2-3.  
8 The term “derivative citizenship” as used here refers to an individual’s acquisition of 
citizenship by virtue of his or her familial relationship to a citizen.   
9 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a) (1970).  Ruben Flores-Villar’s citizenship status is 
governed by the 1970 version of sections 1401 and 1409.  See United States v. Flores-Villar, 
497 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2007).  In 1986, Congress added several requirements 
to the statute governing citizenship transmission between fathers and their nonmarital 
children, but shortened the parental residency requirement applicable to unmarried citizen 
fathers to five years, two of which must have been before he turned fourteen but before the 
birth of the child.  Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
653 § 12, 100 Stat. 3657 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2006)).  
10 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 1-2.  
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single and relatively undemanding requirement: she must have lived in the 
United States for one year at some point in her life.11 
At first blush, the laws challenged in Flores-Villar are not easy to place 
within current debates concerning citizenship or sex equality.  Like 
immigration and naturalization statutes, the laws that govern derivative 
citizenship are expressions of the polity’s power to determine who is a formal, 
rights-bearing member.  But derivative citizenship laws do not involve 
“naturalization” in any traditional respect: the child who qualifies as a citizen 
under these laws is not considered a stranger to the nation who must shed one 
citizenship to don another.12  Rather, he or she is considered a citizen at birth, 
and no ceremonial attestation of national allegiance is required.13  Thus, the 
laws that were at issue in Flores-Villar secure a form of birthright citizenship – 
a right to citizenship by virtue of a circumstance or condition in existence at 
the time of an individual’s birth – but not jus soli birthright citizenship, which 
is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, and is 
frequently in the news today.14 
As a constitutional sex-equality case, Flores-Villar concerned statutes that 
indisputably qualify as legislation by sex-based classification, thereby raising 
 
11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1970).  Justifications for this sex-based system of citizenship 
laws have evolved over the decades.  In Flores-Villar, the federal government urged that the 
more favorable treatment of the nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen mothers was and 
is justified because of such children’s greater risk of statelessness.  See Brief for the United 
States at 38, Flores-Villar, No.  09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764.  This contention lacks support 
in both historical and modern sources.  See infra Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of 
History, Political Science, and Law in support of Petitioner, Flores-Villar v. United States, 
at 1512-15 [hereinafter Brief of Professors], reprint of Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of 
History, Political Science, and Law in Support of Petitioner at 32-37, Flores-Villar, No. 09-
5801, 2011 WL 2297764; Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars on Statelessness in Support of 
Petitioner at 7-27, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764. 
12 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 475 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
13 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401.  
14 In the United States the phrase “birthright citizenship” is used to refer to the 
constitutional right of “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof,” to U.S. citizenship.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Globally and 
historically, however, there are two types of “birthright citizenship”: jus soli and jus 
sanguinis.  Common law countries have tended to follow jus soli, which recognizes the 
child’s place of birth as the source of birthright citizenship.  By contrast, civil law countries 
have tended to follow jus sanguinis, which recognizes the parents’ (or, historically, the 
marital father’s) citizenship as the source of birthright citizenship.  See generally Richard 
W. Flournoy, Jr., Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545, 545-46 (1921).  For 
recent news accounts of efforts to reinterpret or repeal the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guaranty of jus soli citizenship, see, for example, Mark Lacey, Birthright Citizenship Looms 
as Next Immigration Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at A1; George Will, An Argument to 
Be Made About Immigrant Babies and Citizenship, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2010, at A15. 
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doubts as to their constitutionality.15  But at first glance, Flores-Villar did not 
immediately raise any of the principal concerns that have tended to occupy 
gender equality activists in recent decades, such as women’s exclusion from 
the upper echelons of education, workplace equality, violence against women, 
or the privileging of heterosexual coupling.16  Although the case surely 
concerned men’s and women’s respective roles and rights as parents (a subject 
that the Court has wrestled with in more than one equal protection case in 
recent decades), by privileging unwed mothers and their children, the 
challenged statutes present an unusual departure from maternalist legislation 
that, in its most generous forms, has favored married women and mothers.17  
In short, Flores-Villar appears almost esoteric in the issues it raised.  Some 
might conclude, therefore, that outside of the relatively small class of 
individuals in Ruben’s situation, the case’s primary significance was its 
potential to create bad precedent.18  But if sex-based derivative citizenship 
laws seem difficult to place among our modern constitutional concerns, that is 
in part because our constitutional sensibilities are themselves historically 
 
15 See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (“Classifications 
based upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone 
for pervasive and often subtle discrimination.”). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996); United States v. 
Morrision, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621-22 (2007); Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
17 “Maternalist” regulations provide legal protection and financial support for women as 
mothers, and have tended to favor married over unmarried mothers.  See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, 
REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT 201 (1988); Kristin A. Collins, Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based 
Entitlements, Bureaucracy, and the Legal Construction of the Family, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
1085, 1089-90 (2009).  This is not to suggest that unwed mothers have not enjoyed some 
minimal government support, see Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), or greater recognition of their parental rights in 
contrast to unwed fathers, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).  But much of 
the maternalist legislation subject to equal protection challenge has privileged women as 
wives and married mothers.  See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201 (1977); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 678-79 (1973).  By contrast, historically the laws governing derivative citizenship 
significantly limited married mothers’ ability to transmit citizenship relative to both 
unmarried mothers and married fathers.  See infra Brief of Professors, at 1501-06 (original 
at 9-19).   
18 In particular, the concern was that, if the laws at issue in Flores-Villar survived 
constitutional scrutiny, the Court would issue an opinion that either weakened the robust 
standard of judicial scrutiny for sex-based classifications announced in United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996), and/or expanded the plenary powers doctrine that limits 
judicial review in some immigration law cases.  See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977).  
Athough the 4-4 tie left the gender-asymmetrical citizenship laws in place, it averted both of 
these results.  
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conditioned.  Were we living in the 1920s and 1930s, our sensitivities 
regarding such laws would likely be quite different.  Newly armed with the 
vote, first-wave feminists lobbied Congress for decades to equalize our 
citizenship laws, including the predecessor policy of the laws challenged in 
Flores-Villar.  Early twentieth-century feminists were acutely aware of the 
practical and symbolic significance of sex-based citizenship laws and would 
have had no difficulty explaining how those laws were part of this nation’s 
“long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”19   
An important goal of the historians’ amicus brief filed in Flores-Villar is to 
recuperate that understanding by explaining how this ostensibly obscure 
citizenship law is part of a larger historical phenomenon: the persistence of 
gender-based sociolegal norms in determining citizenship.  Over the last 
twenty years, scholars working in different fields have examined the various 
ways in which entrenched beliefs about men’s and women’s social roles and 
capacities have shaped, and continue to shape, the conditions under which 
individuals have been recognized as American citizens in the most minimal 
sense of that term.20  Several of the books and articles that examine this 
phenomenon from a historical perspective are the product of the individual 
efforts of the eight signatories of this amicus brief: Kerry Abrams, Candice 
Bredbenner, Christopher Capozzola, Nancy Cott, Linda Kerber, Virginia 
Sapiro, Rogers Smith, and me.  I am the principal author of the brief, but all of 
the signatories played an active role in its production, reading multiple drafts 
and providing detailed, nuanced comments.  From start to finish, Linda Kerber 
and Kerry Abrams provided enormously helpful counsel regarding strategic 
and historiographic considerations, and they were intimately involved in the 
nitty-gritty research, helping me to review thousands of pages of legislative 
history.  Lindsay Harrison, of Jenner & Block in Washington, D.C., brought 
her considerable talents as an appellate litigator to the task as well, and that 
firm generously provided the resources – human and financial – necessary to 
finalize, print, and file the brief.   
The production of the historians’ amicus brief in Flores-Villar presented an 
unusual opportunity for a group of scholars with shared interests and 
complementary expertise to think collectively about how the past should 
 
19 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684).  
20 In addition to the articles and books authored by the signatories of the brief and cited 
infra and in the amicus brief that follows, see, for example, MARTHA GARDNER, THE 
QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP, 1870-1965 (2004); MAI 
NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 
(2004); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of 
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 407-08 (2005).  For an examination 
of gender’s continuing relevance in U.S. citizenship and immigration laws, see Kerry 
Abrams, Becoming a Citizen: Marriage, Immigration, and Assimilation, in GENDER 
EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 39 (Linda C. McClain & Joanna 
L. Grossman eds., 2009). 
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inform the way we assess sex-based regulation of citizenship today.  As the 
product of these efforts, the brief simultaneously contributes to our 
understanding of why gender continues to shape American citizenship law and 
attempts to further a nearly century-long quest for sex equality in that 
regulatory field.   
*** 
There is no question that, historically, America’s citizenship laws were 
shaped by the kinds of beliefs about men’s and women’s relative capacities 
and roles that our modern constitutional sex-equality doctrine is intended to 
repudiate.  Over the course of the late-Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 
Congress steadily incorporated the gender-asymmetrical premises and 
principles of contemporary marriage law into federal citizenship statutes.21  In 
particular, derivative citizenship among family members was regulated 
according to the concept of “marital unity” – the notion that “the husband and 
wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the 
woman is suspended during the marriage . . . .”22  Following that principle and 
the related concept that the husband was the “head” of the family, within 
marriage American men were recognized as the source of citizenship for their 
foreign-born children starting in 1790; by 1855, they were the source of 
citizenship for their foreign wives as well.23  Meanwhile, American women’s 
subordinate and dependent status in marriage was reinforced by citizenship 
laws that denied their ability to secure citizenship for their foreign-born 
children and by the Expatriation Act of 1907, which stripped women of their 
U.S. citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner.24  Outside marriage, the opposite 
sex-based pattern prevailed with respect to parent-child derivative citizenship.  
Our citizenship laws and policies have long recognized mothers as a source of 
citizenship for their nonmarital children, while barring or severely limiting 
derivative citizenship as between fathers and their nonmarital children.25   
If this elaborate matrix of sex-based citizenship laws seems largely foreign 
to us today, it is not because the “natural” processes of legislation led to the 
gradual shedding of antiquated notions of men’s and women’s rights and roles 
from those laws.26  In fact, one of the striking features of the development of 
 
21 See Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830-
1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1442-43 (1998); Virginia Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and 
Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United States, 13 POL. & SOC’Y 
1, 5-9 (1984).  
22 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. 
23 See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103; Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 
604; infra Brief of Professors, at 1500 (original at 6-7).  
24 Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228.   
25 See Kristin A. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Were Mothers’ Duties: The 
Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1672-74 (2000). 
26 Thus, consistent with Rogers Smith’s analysis of the development of citizenship law in 
the United States, we cannot assume that the story of sex and citizenship law is a 
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our citizenship laws – and a point emphasized in the amicus brief – is how 
legal concepts like “marital unity” and male headship were reinforced and 
preserved in federal citizenship statutes long after they were abandoned and 
repudiated in other sociolegal contexts.27  Rather, the dismantling of much of 
this system of sex-based citizenship regulation is attributable to the efforts of 
first-wave feminists who, operating domestically and internationally, worked 
tirelessly for sex equality in that field.28  
Women’s organizations achieved an important success with the Cable Act 
of 1922, which partially repealed the Expatriation Act of 1907, and thus 
ensured at least some women’s right to retain their American citizenship upon 
marriage to a foreigner.29  But that legislative victory was incomplete.  
Particularly relevant in this case, despite feminists’ best efforts, the Cable Act 
did nothing to ensure sex equality as between American mothers and fathers 
who sought to secure citizenship for their foreign-born children.30  After 
twelve more years of persistent lobbying by women’s organizations, in 1934 
Congress finally equalized parent-child derivative citizenship with respect to 
married citizen mothers and fathers, at least as a formal matter.31  But in the 
1930s, Congress rejected bills that would have extended the sex-equality 
principle to unmarried mothers and fathers.32  Today, derivative citizenship as 
between mothers and their nonmarital foreign-born children remains virtually 
unfettered, while fathers of such children are both burdened and protected by 
an elaborate set of statutory requirements, including the age-calibrated parental 
residency requirement at issue in Flores-Villar.  
*** 
 
progressive narrative about America’s natural, linear movement away from “feudal” 
hierarchies and practices toward full realization of its core liberal-democratic commitments.  
See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 
15 (1997). 
27 See infra Brief of Professors, at 1501-06 (original at 9-19). 
28 CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND 
THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 1-14 (1998).   
29 Act of Sept. 22, 1922 (Cable Act), ch. 411, § 2, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022.  The Cable Act’s 
partial repeal of the Expatriation Act of 1907 was and is rightly heralded as one of the first, 
and most important, post-Nineteenth Amendment victories for women’s organizations.  See 
KRISTI ANDERSEN, AFTER SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN PARTISAN AND ELECTORAL POLITICS BEFORE 
THE NEW DEAL 27 (1996).  However, the Act’s limitations were numerous, including – as 
discussed below – its creation of race-based exceptions to married women’s citizenship 
rights.  See infra discussion accompanying notes 33-39.   
30 See Cable Act, ch. 411, § 2; BREDBENNER, supra note 28, at 168. 
31 Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797, 797-98.  For a discussion of how Congress 
undermined the sex equality achieved in the 1934 Act by creating gender-salient exceptions 
that benefitted married fathers, see infra Brief of Professors, at 1504-06 (original at 15-18). 
32 H.R. 14,684, 71st Cong. (1930); S. 3, 71st Cong. (1930); H.R. 5489, 72d Cong. 
(1931); see also infra Brief of Professors, at 1508-09 (original at 23-25).  
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The amicus brief provides a much more detailed account of this history, but 
– as the name of the genre implies – it, too, only summarizes the complex ways 
in which our citizenship laws have been shaped by gender ideology.  In 
addition, the amicus brief is a legal advocacy document that must foreground 
the facts and analyses judged to be most salient and persuasive in this 
particular case.  I have been asked how these generic limitations and 
conventions influenced the amicus brief’s presentation of the history of sex-
based citizenship laws.  Two issues immediately come to mind.   
The first is the amicus brief’s limited discussion of the many troubling ways 
in which our sex-based citizenship laws have operated in a race-salient 
manner.  The history of U.S. citizenship law cannot be understood without due 
recognition of racism’s central role in shaping the entire regulatory field.  The 
amicus brief is not silent on the subject of race.  For example, it discusses how 
the Cable Act left intact formal race-based restrictions on married women’s 
citizenship rights by continuing to expatriate American women who married 
foreign men “ineligible for citizenship” – a reference to the statutory exclusion 
of Asians from immigration eligibility.33   
But race-based beliefs also influenced – and continue to influence – the 
operation of the formally race-neutral laws that were at issue in Flores-Villar.  
Limitations on citizenship claims asserted by or on behalf of the nonmarital 
foreign-born children of American fathers highlight the troubling practice of 
sexual exploitation of non-white foreign women by white American men.  If 
this suggestion strikes some readers as speculative, consider the statement of 
Edwin Borchard, one of the most well-respected citizenship law experts of the 
early Twentieth Century, who in 1912 uncritically declared that it “seems clear 
that illegitimate half-castes born in semi-barbarous countries of American 
fathers and native women are not American citizens.”34  That quote is included 
in the amicus brief – and one hopes its significance was not lost on the brief’s 
most important readers – but there is much more that could be said on this 
general point.   
To take one example, contrast the United States’s welcoming treatment of 
children born to American soldiers and their European “war brides” during 
World War II, and its resistance to marriages between American soldiers and 
their South East Asian girlfriends during the Korean and Vietnam wars.  As 
Susan Zeiger has demonstrated in compelling detail, the difference between 
 
33 Cable Act, ch. 411, §§ 3, 5, 42 Stat. 1022; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 
Stat. 874, 876; infra Brief of Professors, at 1503 (original at 12-13).  When the Cable Act 
was enacted, the statutory category of persons “ineligible for citizenship” also included 
anarchists, polygamists, and a host of others.  See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 
Stat. 874, 875-77.  Kerry Abrams explores the ways that race and sex-based ideologies 
intersect in federal immigration law in Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of 
Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 643, 677 (2005); see also Volpp, supra note 20, 
at 411-19. 
34 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 612 (1915). 
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these two historical moments lay not just (or even) in the private conduct of 
American soldiers, but also in the official policies and practices of the U.S. 
government.35  During and following World War II, the military encouraged 
soldiers to wed their European sweethearts, and Congress provided the 
soldiers’ non-Asian war brides and children with special immigration status 
through the “war brides” acts and transport to the United States.36  Meanwhile, 
the military thwarted marriages between soldiers and their Asian girlfriends 
during the Korean and Vietnam wars, instead encouraging and facilitating 
casual sexual liaisons.37   
The impact of these policies was not absolute.  Many American soldiers 
serving in Korea and Vietnam ignored their commanders and eventually 
brought home wives and children who became American citizens.38  
Nevertheless, the military’s race-salient policies operated in conjunction with 
gender-asymmetrical derivative citizenship laws: the predominantly white 
babies of World War II soldiers became citizens and “baby boomers,” while 
the vast majority of nonmarital Amerasian babies were excluded and became 
“children of the dust.”39   
Any complete analysis of the legal and historical significance of sex-based 
laws governing parent-child derivative citizenship should account for how 
these laws have operated in conjunction with the military’s racialized marriage 
policies and practices.  However, the details of this phenomenon are extremely 
complex and are still being developed in the secondary literature, making their 
inclusion in the brief particularly challenging given the very strict filing 
deadlines and space limitations that come with Supreme Court litigation.40   
 
35 See SUSAN ZEIGER, ENTANGLING ALLIANCES: FOREIGN WAR BRIDES AND AMERICAN 
SOLDIERS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 2 (2010). 
36 See War Brides Act, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945) (providing non-quota immigrant 
status to alien spouses and minor children of members of the armed forces serving during 
World War II); GI Fiancees Act of June 29, 1946, 60 Stat. 339 (providing special 
immigration status to the fiancees of World War II armed services members).  Starting in 
1947, Congress provided a series of time-limited waivers to racial immigration restrictions 
that had been incorporated into the earlier war brides acts to the exclusion of Asian war 
brides.  See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1947, ch. 289, 60 Stat. 401.  However, couples seeking 
such waivers had only thirty days in which to wed, making them of limited practical 
significance.  See ZEIGER, supra note 35, at 181-82. 
37 See ZEIGER, supra note 35, at 213, 222-25.   
38 See id. at 182-83. 
39 Congress belatedly provided preferred immigration status for Amerasian children of 
American soldiers with the Amerasian Immigration Amendments.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(f) 
(1982) (extending “preferential treatment” in immigrant visa allocation to children fathered 
by U.S. citizens and born in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand after 1950 and 
before October 22, 1982). 
40 Linda Kerber has begun this important work in a recently published essay.  See Linda 
K. Kerber, Birthright Citizenship: The Vulnerability and Resilience of an American 
Constitutional Principle, in JACQUELINE BHABHA, CHILDREN WITHOUT A STATE: A GLOBAL 
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In addition, it is not at all clear that a majority of the sitting justices would 
consider it a problem, as a constitutional matter, that our citizenship laws 
insulate male soldiers and the United States from citizenship claims by or on 
behalf of nonmarital foreign-born children, regardless of the racial dimension 
of the phenomenon.  In Nguyen v. INS, for example, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion refers to the significant numbers of nonmarital children 
fathered by U.S. servicemen as a reason to uphold the limitations on father-
child derivative citizenship, rather than as a reason to be skeptical of the 
validity of these limitations under modern equal protection principles.41  And 
in a Ninth Circuit case raising a similar issue, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld was 
quite candid in his assessment that Congress was well within its constitutional 
authority to pass a statute that would minimize the burdens created by 
“paternity and citizenship claims” asserted by “the women the [U.S.] soldiers 
left behind and their children.”42  “This may not be pretty,” he noted, “but it is 
a rational basis for a sex distinction.”43  In a world where that kind of 
reasoning is acceptable – in at least some judicial circles – focusing on the fact 
that the sexual and marital practices of U.S. soldiers abroad have been shaped 
in part by race-salient government policies seemed more likely to confuse than 
convince.44  
On a closely related note, the amicus brief is also selective in how it 
characterizes the sex-based injury caused by the federal citizenship statutes at 
issue.  Throughout, the brief urges that the gender-asymmetrical regulation of 
parent-child derivative citizenship is unconstitutional because, by recognizing 
and prescribing parental roles along sex lines, it effectively circumscribes 
men’s and women’s liberty interests as citizen-parents.45  That is certainly true, 
and hence the statutory scheme at issue in Flores-Villar runs afoul of 
constitutional sex-equality principles articulated most recently in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, where the Court found that state-
sponsored perpetuation of gender-traditional parental roles violates equal 
protection.46   
 
HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE 255 (2011). 
41 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001).   
42 United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting).  Linda Kerber provides a careful and contextualized discussion of Judge 
Kleinfeld’s reasoning in The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A View from the United States, 
112 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 6 (2007). 
43 Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1129. 
44 A recent empirical study suggests that combining race and sex discrimination claims is 
unwise as a strategic matter.  See Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at 
Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1458 (2009) (observing disproportionately 
high loss rates for individuals who bring discrimination claims based on more than one type 
of discrimination). 
45 Infra Brief of Professors, at 1499, 1507, 1515 (original at 4, 20, 37). 
46 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003).  For a discussion of this aspect of the Court’s reasoning in 
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But there is another important dimension of the injury caused by the laws at 
issue in Flores-Villar that is underdeveloped in the brief.  By restricting 
derivative citizenship as between American fathers and their nonmarital 
foreign-born children, federal citizenship law perpetuates a system of sexual 
ethics that privileges men’s sexual prerogative outside marriage.47  The foreign 
mothers of nonmarital children fathered by Americans are left facing the 
burdens and social stigma of unwed motherhood alone.  In this regard, Flores-
Villar implicated the anti-subordination theory of constitutional sex equality – 
the notion that anti-discrimination principles are not simply intended to remedy 
a history of wrongful “classification,” but should also repudiate gender-based 
sociolegal hierarchies that have resulted in women’s subordination.48  This 
aspect of the operation of our gender-asymmetrical citizenship laws was 
suggested in passing during oral argument in Nguyen v. INS, when Justice 
Ginsburg noted wryly, “[t]here are . . . men out there who are being Johnny 
Appleseed.”49  In her dissenting opinion in that case, Justice O’Connor 
articulated a similar concern, observing that our sex-based citizenship laws are 
“paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility, and 
freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.”50   
After careful consideration, however, I decided not to emphasize this line of 
analysis in the amicus brief, for two reasons.  First, that formulation of the 
injury is a poor fit with the facts of Flores-Villar.  Ruben was raised in his 
American father’s American household from infancy – a fact that makes the 
government’s refusal to recognize him as a citizen particularly troubling.51  
Second, as discussed above, given some jurists’ apparent acceptance of a 
statutory regime that protects American men from paternity claims by 
nonmarital foreign-born children, and in a doctrinal world in which the 
majority of the current justices seem more comfortable with the role-
prescription logic of the sex-equality doctrine, it seemed prudent to tailor the 
characterization of sex-based injury accordingly. 
*** 
Despite the difficult choices that had to be made in drafting the amicus brief 
reprinted below, my hope is that it not only demonstrates that the laws that 
 
Hibbs, see Reva B. Siegel, “You’ve Come A Long Way, Baby”: Rehnquist’s New Approach 
to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871 (2006). 
47 Collins, supra  note 25, at 1700. 
48 The anti-subordination and anti-classification theories of equal protection have been 
discussed by a host of legal scholars.  See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and 
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 32, 38 (1987); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003). 
49 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071); 
see Kerber, supra note 42, at 6.  
50 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
51 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 2. 
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were at issue in Flores-Villar are part of this nation’s “long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination,”52 but also illustrates how those laws implicate 
central – if contested – commitments regarding both sex equality and 
citizenship.  As a sex-equality case, Flores-Villar raised important and 
complicated questions regarding men’s and women’s individual liberty to 
define themselves as parents – free of state-endorsed sex roles – and also 
illuminated the government’s role in supporting a system of sexual ethics that 
should have no place in a modern constitutional democracy.  As a case about 
citizenship, Flores-Villar raised important questions concerning how America 
defines and designs itself as a nation.  The concept of citizenship necessarily 
implies a political community premised on inclusion and exclusion.  And 
despite important developments in international human rights law, the nation-
state remains the primary site for the development and enforcement of 
individual rights.  Precisely because national citizenship status continues as a 
vital source of individual rights and responsibilities, our constitutional 
commitment to equal protection of the laws should apply with full force when 
determining who is and who is not a citizen of the United States.  Early 
twentieth-century feminists understood this fundamental point with respect to 
sex equality.  The historians' amicus brief served its primary purpose if it 
conveyed that basic message to its readers on the Court.   
 
52 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)). 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici curiae listed in the Appendix are professors of history, political 
science, and law with particular expertise in the history of citizenship and 
gender.  Amici have a professional interest in ensuring that the Court is fully 
and accurately informed regarding the historical scope of the law of citizenship 
and the manner in which that law has been shaped and animated by sex-based 
stereotypes and outdated gender norms.  
 
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  Counsel of record for both parties 
received notice at least 10 days prior to the due date of amici’s intention to file this brief.  
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel for a party (nor 
a party itself) made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission 
of this brief.  No person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to 
its preparation or submission. 
 [Editors’ Note: this brief has been modified in form to fit the style of the Boston 
University Law Review.  As such, internal cross-references have been updated.  The brief 
has not otherwise been altered.]  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Sex-based laws premised on outdated or archaic presumptions about the 
proper roles of men and women run afoul of well-established constitutional 
principles, especially when such laws enforce gender-differentiated parental 
roles.  Amici write to elaborate on the history of Congress’s use of sex-based 
classifications in the regulation of citizenship.  Amici demonstrate that, in its 
regulation of intergenerational and interspousal citizenship transmission, 
Congress has consistently relied on and perpetuated sex-based norms 
concerning proper parental roles, even when those norms have changed in 
other contexts and in social practice.  As this brief shows, Congress’s tendency 
to regulate citizenship law using anachronistic gender stereotypes is readily 
apparent in the statutes that govern the citizenship rights of parents of 
nonmarital foreign-born children. 
Historically, the notion that the husband was the legal and political head of 
the marital family was the single most powerful belief to shape the United 
States’ regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship.  That principle has informed 
every aspect of the citizen transmission statutes, including the parental 
residency requirement at issue here.  With respect to married citizen parents, 
the headship principle led to dramatic differences in the rights of citizen fathers 
versus mothers to confer citizenship on their foreign-born children.  While 
married citizen fathers could transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children 
starting in 1790, it was nearly 150 years before Congress recognized the right 
of any married citizen mothers to do the same.   
Outside the bonds of marriage, a mirror opposite pattern prevailed.  
According to powerful sex-based cultural assumptions, mothers bore full 
responsibility for children born out of wedlock; fathers played no role in 
rearing their nonmarital children.  Based on these now-archaic assumptions, 
Congress substantially limited citizenship transmission between citizen fathers 
and their foreign-born nonmarital children in ways unrelated to the need to 
ascertain the existence of a biological or meaningful father-child relationship.  
These limitations persist today.  At the same time, Congress was – and 
continues to be – solicitous of the citizenship claims of nonmarital foreign-
born children of citizen mothers.   
The historical sources are brimming with evidence of the sex-based 
assumptions that have animated U.S. citizenship law and that continue to do 
so.  By contrast, those sources contain little evidence that the minimal parental 
U.S. residency requirement for nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen 
mothers was predicated on a particular concern about the risk of statelessness 
for those children.  Moreover, to the extent statelessness was a concern, 
Congress’s response was itself shaped by preconceived notions about the 
respective roles of men and women in rearing their nonmarital children. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has recognized time and again that laws that distinguish between 
men and women based on outdated understandings of their “respective roles” 
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or “separate spheres” are contrary to constitutional gender-equality principles.  
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971).  To be sure, this Court has by no means foreclosed the ability 
of legislatures to draw sex-based distinctions.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 
U.S. 53 (2001).  But one undeniable theme of these decisions is that such 
distinctions are suspect whenever they presume distinctive societal roles for 
the sexes, both vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis their children.  See, e.g., id. at 
73; Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003).   
In the decision below, the Court of Appeals concluded that the differential 
parental residency requirements contained in the citizenship statutes in 
question, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 and § 1409, do not rest on or perpetuate sex-based 
stereotypes.  Amici respectfully disagree.  A careful reconstruction of the 
history of U.S. citizenship law reveals the actual and archaic source of the 
statutory discrimination at issue.  Especially with respect to nonmarital 
children, Congress has presumed that women are the primary caretakers of 
such children and that a child accordingly has a different and stronger bond 
with its mother than with its father.  By codifying this and other sex-based 
assumptions into citizenship laws, Congress has persistently enforced 
stereotypical views about women as mothers, and men as fathers, long after 
such views have eroded in other areas of law and practice.  See, e.g., Hibbs, 
538 U.S. at 731 (invalidating state laws attributable to the “pervasive sex-role 
stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work”). 
I. CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF INTERGENERATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
TRANSMISSION HISTORICALLY PRIVILEGED MARRIED CITIZEN FATHERS’ 
RIGHTS AND SEVERELY LIMITED THE CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OF MARRIED 
CITIZEN MOTHERS. 
A. The Rights of Married Citizen Fathers Under the Citizenship Laws   
Historically, the husband’s position as “head of the household” enhanced 
men’s cultural, political, and legal authority in myriad contexts beyond the 
household itself.2  Citizenship law was no exception.  See Nancy F. Cott, 
Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103 Am. 
 
2 See generally Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he civil law . . . has always recognized a wide difference in the respective 
spheres and destinies of man and woman. . . .  So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the 
founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a 
woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and 
representative in the social state.”); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth 
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 981-87, 993-
97, 1019-22 (2002) [hereinafter Siegel, She the People] (explaining that the husband’s 
authority in the household provided a foundation for men’s civic participation as voters, 
jurors, and office holders, and a justification for women’s exclusion from those activities).  
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Hist. Rev. 1440, 1452 (1998); Virginia Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and 
Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United States, 13 
Pol. & Soc’y 1, 11 (1984).  Accordingly, the laws governing jus sanguinis 
citizenship privileged the father as the source of citizenship for foreign-born 
children from 1790, when the first citizenship statute was enacted, until 1934.  
See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604 (“Act of 1855”); Act of 
Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 
Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104.  The male 
headship principle was so powerful that even ambiguous statutory language in 
the citizenship statutes of 1790, 1795, and 1802 – which referred only to 
transmission of citizenship to “children of citizens” or “persons” – was 
generally understood to mean the children of citizen fathers.  See 2 James 
Kent, Commentaries on American Law *53 (8th ed. 1854).3  
In the mid-nineteenth century, Congress considered a proposal to repudiate 
the sex bias in the early jus sanguinis citizenship statutes.  See Cong. Globe, 
30th Cong. 1st Sess. 827 (1848) (statement of Sen. Webster) (proposing a bill 
to confer citizenship on all foreign-born children “of a father or mother being 
or having been a natural born citizen of the United States”).  Instead, in 1855 
Congress affirmed the husband-favoring interpretation.  Rewording the statute 
to clarify that only children “whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their 
birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed . . . citizens of the United 
States,” Act of 1855, § 1, 10 Stat. at 604 (emphasis added), Congress codified 
in citizenship law the well-established norm of male headship of the marital 
family.  See Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship 
in U.S. History 234-35 (1997) (noting that the 1855 Act was “true to the law’s 
pervasive patriarchalism”).   
In keeping with social and legal norms privileging the father as the source of 
citizenship for dependents in the marital household, Congress also pronounced 
in 1855 that a non-citizen woman would become an American citizen simply 
by marrying an American man.  Act of 1855, § 2, 10 Stat. at 604.  A primary 
advocate of this change, Representative Cutting of New York, justified it in 
terms of the “merger” doctrine: “[B]y the act of marriage itself the political 
character of the wife shall at once conform to the political character of the 
 
3 It was possible to interpret the early citizenship transmission statutes more restrictively 
to mean that only foreign-born children of two citizen parents would acquire citizenship.  
See 2 Kent, supra, *53; see also Horace Binney, The Alienigenae of the United States, 2 
Am. L. Reg. 193, 207 (1854).  However, as Kent observed, the understanding that citizen 
fathers could convey citizenship to their foreign-born children regardless of the mother’s 
citizenship was consistent with the requirement in all of the early citizenship statutes that 
“the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided 
within the United States.”  Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; see also Act 
of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 
104; 2 Kent, supra, *53.  That interpretation was also consistent with English law on the 
point.  See 2 Kent, supra, *51 (citing 4 Geo. 2, ch. 21 (1731)). 
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husband.”  Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1853) (statement of Rep. 
Cutting).  Cutting assured his fellow congressmen that “there can be no 
objection to” such a law “because women possess no political rights” of their 
own.  Id.  
Congress continued to shape the laws governing intergenerational and 
interspousal citizenship transmission according to the principle of male 
headship even as the social and legal foundations of that principle began to 
erode.4  Thus, when Congress enacted the Cable Act of 1922, eliminating the 
American man’s absolute privilege to endow his foreign wife with citizenship 
simply by marrying her, it continued to reify the male headship principle in 
citizenship law in other ways.  Congress expedited the naturalization process 
for foreign wives of American citizens, Act of Sept. 22, 1922 (Cable Act), ch. 
411, § 2, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022, exempted men’s foreign wives from racial 
quotas, and otherwise gave them preferential immigration status.  Act of May 
26, 1924, ch. 190, §§ 4(a), 4(d), 13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 155, 162.  As discussed 
below, the American woman who married a foreign husband never received 
such preferential treatment; instead, for many decades she would be 
expatriated for marrying a foreigner.  See infra at 1502-03. 
In short, the law governing citizenship transmission reflected and 
perpetuated prevailing social and legal norms that secured men’s place as head 
of the marital family and household.  Well into the twentieth century, national 
legislators presumed that the husband determined the political and cultural 
character of his dependents – wife and children included – and, hence, that the 
dependents’ citizenship should conform to his.  Even in the face of significant 
changes in married women’s legal status, these presumptions continued to 
inform citizenship law until they were gradually and imperfectly dislodged. 
B. The Rights of Married Citizen Mothers Under the Citizenship Laws 
The same norms that informed married fathers’ power to transmit 
citizenship to their foreign-born children conversely led to substantial 
limitations on the citizenship rights of married mothers.  Under the doctrine of 
coverture, wives had no independent civil or legal identity – they were “dead” 
in the eyes of the law.  See Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, 
 
4 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, laws giving husbands power over 
their wives’ legal and economic personae were gradually revised by state legislatures and 
courts under pressure from advocates.  In the 1840s and 1850s, states began to pass married 
women’s property acts, allowing women to retain some control over their separate property 
obtained before marriage, and, slightly later, statutes affording wives the right to their own 
earnings.  See Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 Geo. 
L.J. 1359, 1398-1401 (1983); Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights 
Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 Yale L.J. 1073, 1083 (1994).  
During this period, women began to obtain public law rights as well, including the right to 
vote.  See T.A. Larson, Woman Suffrage in Western America, 38 Utah Hist. Q. 8, 19 (1970); 
U.S. Const. amend. XIX. 
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Marriage, and Property in Nineteenth-Century New York 50-55 (1982).  A 
wife’s legal and political identity was subsumed into that of her husband.  That 
principle was pervasive, shaping the political and legal rights of women – 
married and unmarried – and the social expectations imposed upon them.5  
Even as these powerful social and legal norms were challenged and lost hold 
in other areas of law, see supra note 4, they continued to inform Congress’s 
restriction of married women’s citizenship rights.  Three examples are 
especially germane.   
First, the principle of male headship was integrated into American 
citizenship law through the expatriation of American women who married non-
citizen husbands.  This had not been the common law practice.  See Shanks v. 
Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830) (Story, J.) (“[M]arriage with an alien, 
whether a friend or an enemy, produces no dissolution of the native allegiance 
of the wife.”); Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of her Own: Women, 
Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship 59 (1998).  In the late nineteenth century, 
however, some courts began expatriating American women who married non-
citizens.  Thus, in 1883 a federal court held that an American woman lost her 
citizenship upon marriage to a non-citizen, declaring that “legislation upon the 
subject of naturalization is constantly advancing towards the idea that the 
husband, as the head of the family, is to be considered its political 
representative.”  Pequignot v. City of Detroit, 16 F. 211, 216 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 
1883).  
Consistent with its tendency to enhance, rather than minimize, the sex-
discriminatory function of the citizenship laws, Congress codified the 
Pequignot holding in the Expatriation Act of 1907, which stipulated that “any 
American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her 
husband.”  Act of Mar. 2, 1907 (Expatriation Act), ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 
1228.  Affirming the constitutionality of that Act eight years later, this Court 
observed that “[t]he identity of the husband and wife is an ancient principle of 
our jurisprudence [which] worked in many instances for her protection [and 
which] give[s] dominance to the husband.”  Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 
311 (1915).  As Senator Cable later explained, “for centuries male legislatures 
and jurists” used America’s “grossly unjust” citizenship laws to “jealously 
preserve[] the husband’s dominance and . . . limit[] the wife to a negligible 
sphere of activity and assign[] her to an inconspicuous position in the eyes of 
 
5 Because it was assumed that a married woman operated under her husband’s influence 
and lacked independent will, married women could neither execute contracts nor file suit to 
defend their rights and property without their husbands’ official participation in the lawsuit.  
See Basch, supra, 51.  Similar logic deprived all women of the vote and barred them from 
jury service and office holding, even if they were unmarried.  See Siegel, She the People, 
981-86, 993-97.  Under the strict common law, a married woman also lacked the right to 
custody of her children in the event of separation from or death of the husband – a limitation 
that changed slowly in the nineteenth century.  See Michael Grossberg, Governing the 
Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 235 (1985). 
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the law.”  American Citizenship Rights of Women: Hearing on S. 992, S. 2760, 
S. 3968, and S. 4169 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Immigration, 72d 
Cong. 25 (1933). 
After the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, women’s 
opposition to the Expatriation Act gained force.  See Bredbenner, supra, 81; 
Cott, 103 Am. Hist. Rev. at 1464; Sapiro, 13 Pol. & Soc’y at 13.  But not all 
agreed that women’s suffrage paved the way for equal citizenship rights.  
Resistance was predicated on a persistent valuing of male headship and 
“marital unity,” which presupposed that a wife must and would conform to the 
cultural and political character of the husband.  See 62 Cong. Rec. 9061 (1922) 
(statement of Rep. Mills) (by allowing American women to retain their 
citizenship upon marriage to a non-citizen, “you violate . . . the existing legal 
principle of family unity.”).   
In 1922, Congress enacted the Cable Act, which ended the automatic 
expatriation of some, but not all, American women who married non-citizens.  
Cable Act, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. at 1022.  Congress’s equalization of women’s 
citizenship through the Cable Act was equivocal.  The law continued to 
expatriate any American woman who married a non-citizen and resided in her 
husband’s country for two years, or abroad in any other country for five years.  
Id.  No such limitation has ever applied to an American man who opted to live 
abroad with his non-citizen wife.  Moreover, the Cable Act’s sex-equality 
principle did not extend to those women whose foreign husbands were 
themselves “ineligible to citizenship” under our naturalization laws.  Id. §§ 3, 
5, 42 Stat. at 1022; see also Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the 
Federalization of  Immigration Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 641, 662, 694 n.335 
(2005).  Thus, under the Cable Act the American woman who married a 
racially ineligible non-citizen was still expatriated.  See Linda K. Kerber, No 
Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship 
42-43 (1998).  No such draconian penalty was visited upon an American man 
who did the same.  See Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, §§ 4(a), 4(d), 13(c), 43 
Stat. 153, 155, 162.   
Second, until 1934 the male headship principle also prevented recognition of 
married American women’s capacity to transmit citizenship to their foreign-
born children.  See Bredbenner, supra, 84.  As discussed above, prior to 1855, 
the citizenship statutes were interpreted to preclude transmission of citizenship 
from the married American mother to her foreign-born children.  See Act of 
Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 
Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104; see also supra 
at 1500.  Congress affirmed and codified that interpretation in the citizenship 
statute enacted in 1855.  See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 
604.   
Even after the enactment of the Cable Act in 1922, married women were 
unable to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children.  Strong resistance 
to equalization of that right was premised largely on the belief that the husband 
determined the political and cultural character of the family.  See Relating to 
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Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Certain Children of Mothers Who Are 
Citizens of the United States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain 
Distinctions in Matters of Nationality: Hearings on H.R. 5489 Before the H. 
Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 72d Cong. 18 (1932) [hereinafter 
Hearings on H.R. 5489] (Statement of Sen. Green) (“I am still constrained to 
believe that the man is the head of the family.”); Relating to the Naturalization 
and Citizenship Status of Children Whose Mothers Are Citizens of the United 
States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain Inequalities in Matters of 
Nationality, Hearings on H.R. 3673 and H.R. 77 Before the H. Comm. on 
Immigration and Naturalization, 73d Cong. 29 (1933) [hereinafter Hearings on 
H.R. 3673] (statement of Lieut. Col. Fred B. Ryons) (objecting to citizenship 
transmission by married mothers on the ground that “[t]he head of the family . 
. . has a perfect right and has an obligation as the head of the family to rule his 
family”).  It was not until 1934 that Congress finally recognized the right of 
American wives to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children.  See Act 
of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, 797. 
Third, even after Congress introduced formal statutory equality with respect 
to wives’ ability to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children, beliefs 
about married women’s lack of authority and individual identity within 
marriage continued to shape the citizenship laws in significant ways.  Indeed, 
the equalization of the law regarding married mothers’ and fathers’ right to 
transmit citizenship in 1934 prompted Congress to introduce a child U.S. 
residency requirement, see Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. at 797, 
and a lengthy age-delimited parental U.S. residency requirement for children 
of mixed-nationality couples, see Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(g), 
54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40; see also supra note 3 (noting minimal U.S. residency 
requirement for fathers prior to 1934).   
Although sex-neutral in their wording, the child and parental U.S. residency 
requirements were not sex-neutral in their origins or statutory design.  
Repeatedly in the debates over the 1934 and 1940 acts, legislators and 
witnesses articulated a concern that the foreign-born children of American 
women in mixed-nationality marriages would not be “American” in character 
because the foreign husband would establish the character of his dependents.  
In 1933, an Assistant Secretary of State articulated this shared understanding: 
“It is hardly necessary to say that, when a woman having American nationality 
marries a man having the nationality of a foreign country and establishes her 
home with him in his country, the national character of that country is likely to 
be stamped upon the children, so that from the standpoint of the United States 
they are essentially alien in character.”  See Letter from Assistant Secretary of 
State Wilbur J. Carr to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration 
and Naturalization, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 3673 at 9.  
The belief that the wife and children conformed to the foreign husband’s 
cultural practices and political views first led to the inclusion of a five-year 
age-delimited child U.S. residency requirement in the 1934 Act.  See Act of 
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May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. at 797.  A 1938 letter by a cabinet-level 
committee appointed by President Roosevelt explained this series of events:  
Congress apparently took into consideration the fact that persons born in 
foreign countries whose fathers were nationals of those countries would 
be likely to have stronger ties with the foreign country than with the 
United States, and consequently annexed as a condition for retaining 
citizenship a 5-year period of residence [for the child] in this country 
between the ages of 13 and 18.   
86 Cong. Rec. 11,945 (1940) (letter dated June 1, 1938 from Sec. of State 
Cordell Hull, Att’y Gen. Homer Cummings, and Sec. of Labor Frances 
Perkins) (emphasis added).   
After the 1934 Act went into effect, however, there was concern that the 
child residency requirement improperly limited transmission of citizenship to 
the foreign-born children of American citizen fathers who were married to 
non-citizens.  Such children were believed to conform to the cultural and 
political character of the American “head of the family” – a legal term of art 
that, in this period, referred to the husband/father.6  The same cabinet-level 
committee explained that “these [child] residence requirements will impose 
great hardship in some cases,” especially where the “head of the family” 
worked abroad for the American government or an American enterprise of 
some sort.  Id.  Thus, it recommended an exemption from the child residency 
requirement in such cases.  The committee also recommended the imposition 
of a new requirement that the citizen parent in a mixed-nationality marriage 
“should have resided at least 10 years in the United States prior to the birth of 
the child,” which, again, would not apply to those foreign-born children of 
families where the “head of the family” was an American citizen employed by 
an American enterprise.  Id.   
As a consequence of these sex-based assumptions about parental roles in 
marriage, in 1940 Congress re-configured the citizenship transmission statute 
in a manner that would help preserve husbands’ power and privilege while 
disproportionately constraining married women’s ability to transmit citizenship 
to their foreign-born children.  The resulting exception to the residency 
requirements was phrased to relieve the children of citizen fathers from the 
onerous child and parental residency requirements, while severely diminishing 
the likelihood that the children of citizen mothers would benefit from it.  The 
exception was triggered only when the citizen parent “at the time of the child’s 
birth [was] residing abroad solely or principally in the employment of the 
Government of the United States or a bona fide American . . . organization . . . 
for which he receives substantial compensation.”  Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 
876, § 201(g), 54 Stat. at 1139 (emphasis added).  In the 1940s, married 
women with children were rarely engaged in such employment, especially not 
 
6 See, e.g., Cyclopedic Law Dictionary 522 (3d ed. 1940) (defining “head of a family” in 
terms of the relationship between “father and child” or “husband and wife”).  
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“at the time of [her] child’s birth,” and hence the exception was of little use to 
citizen mothers.7  Even the details of the parental residency requirement thus 
evince the imprint of the male headship principle and the corresponding belief 
that the wife and children conformed to the cultural and political character of 
the husband.   
In short, the profound limitations on the citizenship rights of married women 
– including their right to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children – 
were corollaries to the sex-differentiated norm that empowered married men to 
transmit citizenship to their wives and foreign-born children.  Congress’s 
regulation of jus sanguinis and derivative citizenship not only reflected those 
sex-based norms, but extended their vitality in citizenship law even as similar 
sex-based distinctions were eroding in other contexts.  
II. SEX-BASED GENERALIZATIONS ANIMATED – AND CONTINUE TO 
ANIMATE – THE DISPARATE CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED CITIZEN 
FATHERS AND MOTHERS. 
Outside the bonds of marriage, a mirror opposite pattern of sex-based 
regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship prevailed.  Courts, administrators, and 
Congress have readily recognized citizenship claims of the foreign-born 
children of unmarried citizen mothers, and Congress imposed only a minimal 
parental residency requirement in such cases.  By contrast, transmission of 
citizenship between fathers and their nonmarital foreign-born children was, 
and is, severely limited.  
At first glance, this system may appear to be in tension with the male-
privileging norm that operated in the marital context, but the two systems were 
shaped by the same constellation of sex-based social norms.  The man’s 
headship over his marital family was a right and privilege linked to his control 
over and responsibilities for his dependents.  But the man who fathered a child 
outside of marriage was presumed to have no relationship with or 
responsibility for his child.  Meanwhile, the woman who had a child out of 
wedlock experienced the social ignominy of and bore full responsibility for the 
child.   
Through its regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship, Congress reinforced and 
perpetuated these gendered norms regarding men’s and women’s respective 
roles and responsibilities as parents outside marriage.  By codifying a system 
of citizenship laws that enforced sex-differentiated family roles, Congress 
constrained individual mothers’ and fathers’ ability to decide how to perform 
their roles as parents.  The statutory provision at issue in this case continues 
 
7 Women seeking employment abroad as Foreign Service officers faced almost 
insurmountable sex discrimination.  See Homer L. Calkin, Women in American Foreign 
Affairs 102-103, 110 (1977).  Moreover, in the mid-twentieth century, working women were 
often lawfully dismissed during pregnancy, and few had access to maternity leave or job 
security after the birth of a child.  See Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, 
Men and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America 210-11 (2001).   
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this transparently sex-discriminatory means of regulating citizenship 
transmission, even as the social and legal norms regarding nonmarital 
parenthood have evolved.   
A. Citizenship Transmission from Citizen Fathers to Nonmarital Children 
Premised on the outdated view that fathers have only attenuated 
relationships with their nonmarital children and that the government should 
recognize such relationships only in extremely limited circumstances, U.S. 
citizenship laws have consistently encumbered citizenship transmission from 
citizen fathers to their nonmarital children.  
For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, domestic relations 
laws generally insulated men from their nonmarital children by disfavoring 
those children’s claims to property and status, even when the children had been 
legitimated.  See Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the 
Family in Nineteenth-Century America 221-22, 232-33 (1985).8  Well into the 
early twentieth century, domestic relations laws in most states resisted 
recognition of the father-child relationship outside of marriage and 
demonstrated solicitousness for putative fathers who wished to avoid their 
parental responsibilities.  See id. at 199, 217, 231-32.  These laws both evinced 
and perpetuated powerful cultural resistance to men’s responsibility for – and 
relationships with – their nonmarital children.  
Such resistance also shaped the regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship, even 
before Congress first addressed the citizenship status of foreign-born 
nonmarital children in 1940.  From 1790 until 1940, the citizenship statutes 
were silent as to the marital status of the citizen parent.  See Act of Feb. 10, 
1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604; Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 
153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 
1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104.  Nevertheless, these statutes were interpreted to 
allow transmission of citizenship to the marital children of citizen fathers, but 
not to their illegitimate children.  The lead nineteenth-century case in this area, 
Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864), demonstrates just how rigid this limitation 
was.  In Guyer, the father had recognized his children, given them his name, 
and named them in his will.  Yet the court refused to recognize their claims to 
legitimacy, and thus to citizenship.  See Guyer, 22 Md. at 249 (finding that the 
citizen father’s children were “illegitimate; under our law nullius filii, and 
clearly therefore not within the provisions of the [1802] Act”).   
Courts and administrators gradually recognized the citizenship claims of at 
least some nonmarital foreign-born children who had been legitimated by the 
citizen father.  See 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 162, 164-65 (1920); House Comm. on 
 
8 Under the common law, a nonmarital child was nullius filius.  The law did not 
recognize a legal relationship between the child and either of his parents.  See 2 Kent, supra, 
*212; see also Wilfrid Hooper, The Law of Illegitimacy 25, 122, 135 (1911) (the nonmarital 
child had no right to inherit, no right to the surname of either parent, and no claim on them 
for support or education).   
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Immigration & Naturalization, 76th Cong., Report Proposing a Revision and 
Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United States, Part One: Proposed 
Code with Explanatory Comments 17 (Comm. Print 1939) [hereinafter 
Proposed Code].  But the legitimation exception was narrow and uncertain, 
with courts and administrators erecting a high bar when assessing citizenship 
claims asserted by or on behalf of the nonmarital children of citizen fathers.  
See, e.g., Mason ex rel Chen Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588 (1st Cir. 1928) 
(affirming rejection of evidence of legitimation for purposes of determining 
citizenship of foreign-born nonmarital child of American father); Ng Suey Hi v. 
Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1927) (holding that “illegitimate children, 
born abroad of citizens, being nullius filii” are not citizens under  the 
citizenship statute, and rejecting evidence of legitimation by American father); 
Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 612 (1915) 
(“[I]t seems clear that illegitimate half-castes born in semi-barbarous countries 
of American fathers and native women are not American citizens.”).  
In 1934, Congress had the opportunity to introduce sex equality into the 
laws governing jus sanguinis citizenship for nonmarital children, but it refused 
to do so.  The sex-based understanding that that men played an attenuated and 
discretionary role in the lives of their nonmarital children provided crucial 
context for the legislative debates over citizenship transmission to such 
children.  Bills introduced in the early 1930s would have secured parental sex 
equality with respect to transmission of citizenship to foreign-born children of 
citizen parents, regardless of the parents’ marital status:  
Any child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, born out of the limits and 
jurisdiction of the United States, whose father or mother may be at the 
time of the birth of such child a citizen of the United States, is declared to 
be a citizen of the United States; but the right of citizenship shall not 
descend to any child whose father or mother had never resided in the 
United States previous to the birth of such child. 
H.R. 14,684, 71st Cong. § 3 (1930) (emphasis added); see also H.R. 5489, 72d 
Cong. (1931).  
Supporters of this bill urged that equal treatment of the citizen mothers and 
fathers of nonmarital foreign-born children was warranted pursuant to the sex-
equality principles that informed the 1922 Cable Act.  This included the 
principle that mothers and fathers should have equal rights to confer 
citizenship to their nonmarital children, and equal responsibility for such 
children.  See Hearings on H.R. 5489 at 3-5. (Statement of Burnita Shelton 
Matthews); id. at 17-19 (Statement of Laura Berrien); see also Kristin Collins, 
Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal 
Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 Yale L.J. 1669, 1693-98 (2000).  
Importantly, the proponents of sex equality in citizenship laws were aware 
that, in the context of the nonmarital child, proof of paternity would be 
required.  They stressed that procedures would have to be adopted in order to 
ensure that the child was, indeed, the child of the citizen father.  See Hearings 
on H.R. 5489 at 6 (Statement of Burnita Shelton Matthews) (“We may rest 
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assured, it seems to me, that adequate proof is required before the right to the 
protection of the country is afforded.  It is unlikely that any person entitled to 
protection under this bill would get it unless proof were conclusive.”).  But, 
beyond that, they sought equal treatment of mothers and fathers in the 
transmission of citizenship to nonmarital foreign-born children.  Id. at 3-5, 17-
18. 
Nevertheless, opponents resisted sex-equality in the regulation of jus 
sanguinis citizenship of nonmarital foreign-born children not primarily 
because they were worried about fraud, but because it offended the deeply-held 
view that the law did not – and should not – recognize the relationship of the 
father and his nonmarital child.  As one congressman explained in an exchange 
with a proponent of the bill: “The child cannot inherit. It would not do, if he 
could.  You are trying to undo what practically all of the big States in the 
country have held to be the proper procedure (to give to this child 
consideration) but you are giving an illegitimate child consideration.”  
Hearings on H.R. 5489 at 5 (statement of Rep. Jenkins).  These concerns, as 
well as stubborn resistance to full gender equality in matters relating to 
citizenship, were fatal to the inclusion of “illegitimate” in the bill.  See 
Bredbenner, supra, 230-31; Collins, 109 Yale L.J. at 1697.  As a consequence, 
when Congress in 1934 passed a statute enabling married mothers to transmit 
citizenship to their foreign-born children, the final version of the bill said 
nothing concerning parental marital status, but was understood to apply to the 
foreign-born children of married citizen parents only.  See 78 Cong. Rec. 7357 
(1934) (“[This bill] applies to the children of wives and the children of 
husbands.”) (statement of Rep. Jenkins); 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 290, 291 (1939) 
(recognizing “that the applicable statutory provisions [in the citizenship laws] 
apply only to legitimate children”).9 
Six years later, Congress finally addressed the citizenship status of foreign-
born nonmarital children, making explicit what had been understood for 
decades: American citizenship law would continue to distance fathers from 
their nonmarital children.  See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201(g) & 
205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40.  The Nationality Act of 1940 codified and carried 
forward many of the pre-existing practices of courts and administrators.  But it 
also extended the law’s sex-based differential treatment of citizen parents by 
imposing new limitations on transmission of citizenship from citizen fathers to 
nonmarital foreign-born children through a host of requirements that did not 
apply to citizen mothers: mandatory legitimation during the child’s minority; a 
ten-year, age-delimited U.S. residency requirement for the father; and a five-
year, age-delimited U.S. residency requirement for the child.  Id.   
 
9 Some sources suggested that the 1934 Act provided statutory authority for transmission 
of citizenship to the foreign-born nonmarital child of a citizen mother.  See In re M-----, 4 I. 
& N. Dec. 440 (B.I.A. 1951); Lester B. Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 99, 105 (1934). 
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In 1952, Congress essentially re-codified this system, including the ten-year 
age-delimited parental residency requirement that applied to citizen fathers of 
foreign-born nonmarital children, but not to citizen mothers of such children.  
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, §§ 301(a)(7) & 309, 66 
Stat. 163, 236-38.  It was the 1952 version of this statute that was in effect in 
1974 when Petitioner was born.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1970).  Congress 
has re-codified this basic statute with minor changes on several occasions since 
then.  See, e.g., Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 13, 100 Stat. 
3655, 3657.  But despite advances in legal norms regarding fathers’ rights and 
responsibilities with respect to their nonmarital children,10 Congress continues 
to impose a significantly longer residency requirement on citizen fathers of 
nonmarital children – even where, as here, the father has legitimated the child 
and has raised him in his American home.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g) & 1409(a) 
(requiring that fathers of nonmarital foreign-born children satisfy a five-year 
age-delimited U.S. residency requirement). 
In short, consistent with its long-standing tendency, Congress has codified 
particular and anachronistic sex-based norms concerning father-child relations 
in the laws governing citizenship transmission to nonmarital foreign-born 
children.  It has done so notwithstanding the erosion of these norms in other 
areas of law and in individual mothers’ and fathers’ everyday practices as 
parents.  
B. Citizenship Transmission from Citizen Mothers to Nonmarital Children   
The United States has been far more solicitous of the citizenship claims of 
foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen mothers than it has of claims of the 
nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen fathers.  As a general matter, all 
three branches of the U.S. government have consistently recognized the mother 
as a source of citizenship for nonmarital, foreign-born children.  The ready 
recognition of the mother-child relationship reflects the sex-based assumption 
that the mother, but not the father, bears the rights and responsibility of unwed 
parenthood.11 
 
10 See, e.g., Restatement 3d Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) § 2.5 (1999) 
(“For purposes of intestate succession by, from, or through an individual . . . [a]n individual 
is the child of his or her genetic parents, whether or not they are married to each other . . . 
.”); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979) (prohibiting state from 
distinguishing between unwed mothers and fathers solely on the basis of sex where the 
father maintains a parent-child relationship).  
11 In a departure from the strict common law principle of nullius filius, judges and 
legislators in both England and America gradually began to acknowledge the mother-child 
relationship outside marriage so as to ensure a responsible care provider and source of 
material support.  See Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109, 111 (1806) (Parsons, C.J.) (“[T]o 
provide for [the bastard’s] support and education, the mother has a right to the custody and 
control of him, and is bound to maintain him, as his natural guardian.”).  As a consequence, 
by the early twentieth-century, many of the limitations on the legal relationship between the 
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Officials administering the citizenship laws generally recognized the 
citizenship claims of foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen mothers long 
before Congress regulated the subject.  See, e.g., Proposed Code at 18 (noting 
that “the Department of State has, at least since 1912, uniformly held that an 
illegitimate child born abroad of an American mother acquires at birth the 
nationality of the mother”); Frederick Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United 
States 49 (1904); Lester B. Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 99, 105 (1934) (citing a State Department memo of October 27, 1932).12  
A 1939 House Committee report acknowledged this practice and explained 
that it made sense in a social and legal environment in which, outside marriage, 
the mother “stands in the place of the father.”  Proposed Code at 18.  That 
often-used phrase functioned as a reference to the mother’s superior parental 
rights and responsibilities with respect to her nonmarital children, and also 
reflected a social and cultural belief that mothers, not fathers, sustained 
relationships with nonmarital children.  Hence, a 1939 Attorney General 
Opinion notes that the exclusion of such children from the United States would 
be “not only harsh, but largely impractical.”  39 Op. Att’y Gen. at 291. 
In 1940, Congress codified the administrative practice of maternal 
transmission of citizenship to nonmarital foreign-born children.  Section 205 of 
the Nationality Act of 1940 provided that if the “mother had the nationality of 
the United States at the time of the child’s birth, and had previously resided in 
the United States or one of its outlying possessions,” the child “shall be held to 
have acquired at birth her nationality status.”  See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 
876, § 205, 54 Stat. at 1139-40.  Thus, unlike the transmission of citizenship to 
the nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen fathers, citizenship transmission 
between the citizen mother and nonmarital child was largely unencumbered.13  
Citizen mothers who wished – or wish – to secure citizenship for their 
nonmarital foreign-born children have never been required to provide proof of 
maternity, pledge support for their minor children, satisfy a child residency 
 
nonmarital child and his mother had been repealed.  Grossberg, supra, 224-25.  These 
changes corresponded with a growing consensus that the mother was the natural and 
presumed caretaker of her children – a cultural norm that strengthened mothers’ legal 
custodial rights both in and out of marriage.  Id. at 209, 225, 234-35.   
12 But see 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 290, 290-91 (1939) (acknowledging that nonmarital 
children of citizen mothers have been recognized as citizens, but finding that such children 
do not fall within the text of existing legislation and that “resort to the Congress for 
additional legislation is desirable”). 
13 Indeed, the primary statutory limitation on transmission of citizenship between 
American mothers and their nonmarital foreign-born children contained in the Nationality 
Act of 1940 – that the child would take the citizenship of her American mother only “in the 
absence of . . . legitimation” by the father – was deleted in the recodification of the 
provision in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952.  See Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 309, 66 Stat. at 238-39.  
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requirement, or satisfy a lengthy age-delimited parental U.S. residency 
requirement of the sort at issue in this case.14 
The historical sources make clear that Congress’s solicitude for the 
nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen mothers had three primary 
motivations.  First, in 1940 Congress was engaged in a massive overhaul of the 
country’s nationality laws, and it sought to standardize numerous 
administrative practices that had not yet been codified.  During this process, 
Congress was aware of the State Department’s recognition of the citizenship of 
nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers.  See Proposed Code, 
supra, 18.  Congress thus codified this long-standing, sex-based, extra-
statutory practice. 
Second, ready recognition of the mother as the source of jus sanguinis 
citizenship for nonmarital children was consistent with the sex-based 
presumption that mothers, not fathers, were the caretakers of nonmarital 
children.  Legislators who, as discussed above, were hostile toward proposals 
to recognize citizenship claims of citizen fathers’ nonmarital foreign-born 
children characterized the State Department’s recognition of nonmarital 
foreign-born children of citizen mothers “as a great boon” for the 
“unfortunate” mother.  Hearings on H.R. 5489 at 5 (statement of Rep. Jenkins).   
Third, at a time when nations around the globe were engaged in a concerted 
effort to rationalize the laws governing citizenship and nationality, the 
legislators and their advisors were mindful of the sex-based laws and policies 
of other countries on the question of jus sanguinis citizenship of all children, 
including nonmarital children.  See Proposed Code at 18 (citing Durward V. 
Sandifer, A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth and to 
Loss of Nationality, 29 Am. J. Int’l L. 248, 258-59 (1935)).  Accordingly, it 
appears that congressional recognition of the citizenship claims of the foreign-
born children of unwed mothers was fortified by the fact that many other 
countries had similar practices consistent with prevailing American sex-based 
views about unmarried mothers’ and fathers’ legal and caregiving relationships 
with their children.  See Proposed Code at 18 (noting the rule that the mother 
“stands in place of the father” for nonmarital children, that such a rule follows 
Roman law and American domestic law, and that “the laws of some thirty 
countries” recognize the citizenship status of nonmarital children of citizen 
mothers).  
In the case before the Court, the United States has argued that in 1940 
Congress eased the conditions under which mothers transmit citizenship to 
their foreign-born nonmarital children – and, in particular, exemption from the 
ten-year age-delimited parental residency requirement – out of concern for the 
risk of statelessness for that class of children.  See Brief of United States, 
United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-50445), 
 
14 In 1952, Congress strengthened the parental residency requirement applicable to 
citizen mothers of foreign-born nonmarital children, increasing it to one year.  See 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 309(c), 66 Stat. at 238-39.  
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2008 WL 1848810.  Based on the historical sources, this assertion is overstated 
and incomplete.  For example, the primary legislative report on the 1940 Act 
refers to the risk of statelessness with respect to “foundlings,” but not with 
respect to the nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen mothers.  Proposed 
Code at 17-18.  Proposed Section 203(c), codified in the 1940 Act as Section 
204(c), provided that a “child of unknown parentage found in an outlying 
possession of the United States” would have U.S. nationality until proven 
otherwise.  Id.  The purpose of that provision, according to the report, was to 
“prevent unfortunate persons of the class mentioned from being stateless.”  
Proposed Code at 17.  By contrast, the report’s remarks on proposed Section 
204, which was to govern the transmission of citizenship from citizen parents 
to their nonmarital foreign-born children, does not identify statelessness as a 
concern.15 
Moreover, to the extent that any legislators were focused on the risk of 
statelessness to the foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen mothers in 1940 
when they first created the statutory scheme, their attentiveness was selective 
in ways that powerfully reflected and perpetuated the sex-based beliefs 
concerning parental rights and responsibilities that have coursed through our 
citizenship laws generally.   
Nationality and statelessness were subjects of intense study and international 
concern in the 1930s.16  The most important American work on the subject was 
written by Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, a professor and the head of the 
department of government at American University.  See Catheryn Seckler-
Hudson, Statelessness: With Special Reference to the United States (1934).17  
Seckler-Hudson wrote about the risk of statelessness facing the foreign-born 
nonmarital children of U.S. citizen mothers and fathers.  See id. at 224-25.   
As an initial matter, Seckler-Hudson was skeptical that, in 1934, the United 
States would recognize foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen fathers as 
American citizens, whether legitimated or not.  See id. at 224 (“Legitimation 
does not necessarily offer a remedy [for statelessness] for these children.”); id. 
at 220-21 (citing Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864)).  Accordingly, she 
observed that when such children were born in jus sanguinis countries in 
 
15 Section 204 of the Proposed Code was codified as Section 205 of the 1940 Act.  
16 Nationality law and the related subject of statelessness were primary subjects of 
consideration at the First Conference for the Codification of International Law at The Hague 
in 1930.  See Manley O. Hudson, The First Conference for the Codification of International 
Law, 24 Am. J. Int’l L. 447, 453 (1930). 
17 Seckler-Hudson’s work was well known at the time of its publication and remained a 
prominently cited source on statelessness.  See, e.g., Ellery C. Stowell, Book Review, 30 
Am. J. Int’l L. 170 (1936) (reviewing William O’Sullivan Molony, Nationality and the 
Peace Treaties (1934)); Maximilian Koessler, “Subject,” “Citizen,” “National,” and 
“Permanent Allegiance”, 56 Yale L.J. 58, 69 n.67 (1946); Comment, The Expatriation Act 
of 1954, 64 Yale L.J. 1164, 1196 n.161 (1955); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 161 n.15 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.35 (1958). 
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which they did not acquire nationality through the mother, they “had no 
effective citizenship.”  Id. at 221.  Cf. William Samore, Statelessness as a 
Consequence of the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 45 Am. J. Int’l L. 476, 479 
(1951) (“[T]he unacknowledged child of an American father born of an alien 
woman abroad would be stateless, providing the woman’s state does not 
extend its nationality to the child.”). 
In addition – and of particular significance in this case – Seckler-Hudson 
noted the risk of statelessness for nonmarital children born to American fathers 
who did not satisfy the parental residency requirement.  See Seckler-Hudson, 
supra, 220, 225 (“[T]he illegitimate child of a foreign-born father, the father 
being an American citizen but never having resided in the United States, would 
not be an American citizen” and “unless the country of his birth gave him its 
nationality, he would be stateless”).18  The risks of statelessness for foreign-
born nonmarital children of citizen fathers were thus well known when 
Congress was considering the question of how to regulate citizenship 
transmission to nonmarital foreign-born children.   
Congress was presented with, but chose not to enact, a legislative proposal 
that would have remedied the various risks of statelessness confronting 
foreign-born children of American citizen mothers and fathers.  In her treatise, 
Seckler-Hudson described a sex-neutral and marriage-neutral citizenship 
transmission bill that had been introduced in Congress.  It was the very same 
bill, described supra at 1508, introduced in the early 1930s that provided that 
“[a]ny child, legitimate or illegitimate” born abroad of a citizen mother or 
father was to be an American citizen, subject to a simple (and gender-neutral) 
parental residency requirement.  See Seckler-Hudson, supra, 222 (quoting H.R. 
5489, 72d Cong. (1931)).  Despite the fact that the leading authority on 
statelessness endorsed such legislation, in 1940 and again in 1952 Congress 
enacted legislation that perpetuated and even intensified the sex inequalities in 
our jus sanguinis citizenship statutes by shoring up substantial barriers to 
citizenship transmission between a citizen father and his nonmarital foreign-
born child.  
In sum, it is possible that Congress was concerned about statelessness when 
it exempted unwed mothers from the lengthy parental residency requirement 
that applied to unwed fathers.  But if this was so, Congress acted on its concern 
in a sex-discriminatory manner.  Congress opted to ignore the acknowledged 
risk of statelessness that confronted nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen 
 
18 Seckler-Hudson did not specify whether she was referring to both legitimated and 
unlegitimated children in this passage, but her view that the United States did not regularly 
recognize the citizenship of nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen fathers regardless of 
legitimation suggests that the difference was not dispositive to her views.  See Seckler-
Hudson, supra, 224.  In addition, given that the parental residency requirement in 1934 was 
of unspecified and minimal duration, see supra note 3, when Congress enacted the 1940 Act 
with a 10-year age-delimited parental residency requirement, the risk Seckler-Hudson 
observed would have increased significantly. 
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fathers.  It also opted to ignore a proposed legislative solution that would have 
addressed any concern about statelessness in a more thorough, sex-neutral 
manner.  Thus, to the extent that Congress’s legislation in this area was 
prompted by a concern about statelessness, that concern was filtered through 
and premised on the same constellation of sex-based presumptions regarding 
how men and women behave as parents that has characterized the United 
States’ approach to citizenship transmission since 1790.   
Laws premised on historically rooted sex-based assumptions concerning 
how men and women behave as parents – and how they should behave – have 
no place in the regulation of citizenship transmission today.  Although 
certainly many nonmarital children are raised exclusively or primarily by their 
mothers, others – like Petitioner – are raised in their father’s household.  Our 
current domestic laws reflect these developments and eschew the antiquated 
notion that the mother bears singular responsibility for the nonmarital child.  
See supra note 10.  It is no longer acceptable for Congress to enact laws that 
enforce gender-differentiated family roles by limiting individuals’ rights as 
parents through sex-based classifications.  The historical record demonstrates, 
however, that Congress has done just that in its regulation of jus sanguinis 
citizenship.  With respect to foreign-born nonmarital children, Congress 
continues to enforce sex-based stereotypes and, in so doing, prolongs the 
vitality of gender-traditional beliefs concerning men’s and women’s respective 
roles as parents, even as such beliefs have eroded in other areas of law and in 
our social practices.   
CONCLUSION 
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